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Exclusive Afghan Cricket Team: A Divisive Legacy of Ethnic Privilege

Kabul Press - Investigative News & Analysis — 2023-10-24T17:20:17Z

In the midst of the turbulent and deeply divided landscape of the so-called Afghanistan, cricket has emerged as an unlikely symbol of privilege and exclusivity. The Afghan cricket team, often portrayed as a unifying force for the nation, is anything but that. It consists entirely of Pashtun players with Pakistani origins and enjoys the overt support of the Taliban, while non-Pashtuns continue to face persecution in the country.

From its inception, the Afghan cricket team was designed to be a Pashtun-exclusive entity. This exclusivity has historical roots, stemming from a divisive approach to unity. In the so-called Afghanistan, the concept of a united nation has been tenuous at best, with Pashtun interests often being enforced as national interests. The cricket team's composition is a glaring reflection of this enduring division.

Adding to the complexity of the issue is the fact that "Afghan" is not an identity accepted by the majority of non-Pashtuns. In a nation marked by ethnic diversity, the term "Afghan" is often perceived as synonymous with Pashtun identity, further marginalizing other ethnic groups. This lack of inclusivity has only deepened the fault lines in the country's society.

The involvement of the Taliban in supporting the Pashtun-dominated cricket team adds another layer of controversy. The Taliban, a terrorist group that has gained control over so-called Afghanistan, is notorious for its repressive policies against non-Pashtuns and its systematic exclusion of women from public life. While the Taliban ruthlessly enforces its regressive ideologies, it publicly endorses the Pashtun-dominated cricket team, making it clear where its priorities lie.

The game of cricket itself brought to the region during British colonization, lacks native roots in the region. It is a colonial import and was not a traditional sport of the region. This fact further highlights the incongruity of the situation: a foreign sport being manipulated to reinforce an ethnic divide.

The Afghan cricket team continues to deepen divisions and reinforce Pashtun ethnic privilege. The cricket field, which should be a place of unity and sportsmanship, is instead a stark reminder of the ongoing divisions and the precarious state of affairs in the so-called Afghanistan.

The Influence of Prominent Pashtuns in Shaping Perceptions and Misrepresentations in So-Called Afghanistan

Kabul Press AI — 2023-09-30T19:21:09Z

Introduction

The situation in the so-called country Afghanistan is complex, marked by ethnic tensions, gender disparities, and the resurgence of the Taliban. Amidst this turmoil, the Hazara of Hazaristan, along with other non-Pashtun ethnic groups, face a grim reality where their fundamental rights are systematically being eliminated. In this article, we examine how the terrorist group, the Taliban, is contributing to this dire situation and highlight the role of some well-educated Pashtuns including their women in supporting the Taliban, as well as the problematic involvement of organizations like PRIO.

Ethnic Disparities and Erasure in the So-Called Afghanistan

In the so-called Afghanistan, the issue of ethnic disparities and erasure is a deeply entrenched problem that has persisted for decades, and it continues to play a significant role in the country's complex socio-political landscape.

Diverse Ethnic Landscape: The so-called Afghanistan is home to a diverse array of ethnic groups and national, with Hazaras, Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and many others coexisting within its borders. These groups have distinct languages, cultures, and historical backgrounds.

Marginalization of Non-Pashtun Ethnic Groups: Despite this diversity, non-Pashtun ethnic groups, such as the Hazara, have frequently found themselves marginalized and subjected to genocide, forced displacement, and systemic discrimination. The Pashtun-majority governments and power structures have historically favored their own ethnic group, perpetuating a cycle of exclusion.

Disregarding Unique Identities: The erasure of non-Pashtun identities is a prevalent issue in the so-called Afghanistan. The tendency to homogenize the nation under a Pashtun-centric narrative often leads to the neglect and suppression of the unique cultural and linguistic identities of non-Pashtun communities.

Political Representation: Non-Pashtun groups have struggled to secure equitable political representation in the country's governance. This lack of political inclusivity has contributed to feelings of disenfranchisement and a sense of exclusion from the decision-making processes that affect their lives. That is why many non-Pashtuns are in favor of a federal system or partition to access the right of self-determination.

Ethnic-Based Conflict: The ethnic disparities and erasure have fueled ethnic-based conflicts, exacerbated tensions, and contributed to instability in the region. These conflicts often arise from grievances related to unequal access to resources, opportunities, and political power.

Propaganda and False Information: The dissemination of propaganda and false information further complicates the issue of ethnic disparities. Claims that Pashtuns are the majority in the so-called Afghanistan are often rooted in narratives designed to perpetuate Pashtun dominance.

Countering Ethnic Stereotypes: To address these challenges, it is crucial to challenge ethnic stereotypes and narratives that perpetuate division. Promoting diversity, respecting the rights to self-determination, inter-ethnic dialogue, understanding, and cooperation can be vital steps toward mitigating ethnic tensions.

Acknowledgment of Ethnic Diversity: Acknowledging the rich ethnic diversity within the so-called Afghanistan and recognizing the distinct identities of each group is essential for building a more inclusive and equitable society. This includes preserving and promoting minority languages, cultures, and traditions.

Taliban's Assault on Fundamental Rights and the Genocide of the Hazara in So-Called Afghanistan

The resurgence of the Taliban in the so-called Afghanistan has brought with it a dark cloud of oppression, particularly for non-Pashtun ethnic groups and nations like the Hazara. This extremist group's history of human rights violations has escalated to horrifying levels, including the genocide of the Hazara people and the systematic destruction of their historical and cultural identities.

On this day last year, a horrific attack on Kaaj educational centre in #Kabul left 54 dead & 114 wounded - mostly young Hazara women & girls. UNAMA stands with victims and relatives affected by this & so many other senseless acts of violence in #Afghanistan. pic.twitter.com/aVPJJF5mCJ

— UNAMA News (@UNAMAnews) September 30, 2023

Genocide of the Hazara: The Hazara community, as a stateless nation within the so-called Afghanistan, has been subjected to brutal genocidal campaigns by the Taliban. The atrocities against the Hazara population include mass killings, forced displacement, and the intentional targeting of Hazara civilians, including women and children. These actions constitute clear violations of fundamental human rights and international law.

In 1890, after the collapse of the state of Hazaristan following war with Afghanistan, 62% of indigenous Hazara were brutally killed by Afghanistan. On #HazaraGenocideMemorialDay, the @LemkinInstitute remembers the longstanding effects of the genocide and subsequent displacement… pic.twitter.com/DouXyn3Lzi

— Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention (@LemkinInstitute) September 26, 2023

Destruction of Cultural Heritage: One of the most notorious acts of cultural vandalism committed by the Taliban was the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, colossal statues carved into cliffs in Hazaristan. This UNESCO World Heritage site represented not only the rich cultural history of the Hazara but also the diverse cultural tapestry of the so-called Afghanistan. Its destruction was a tragic loss for humanity.

Suppression of Religious Freedom: The Taliban's harsh interpretation of Islamic law has led to the suppression of religious freedom, particularly for the Hazara population, who predominantly belong to the Shia branch of Islam. Hazara religious practices, shrines, and mosques have been targeted and desecrated, preventing the community from freely practicing their faith.

Displacement and Suffering: The Hazara people have faced forced displacement from their ancestral lands, leading to immense suffering. Many have been forced to flee their homes, living in squalid conditions as internally displaced persons or seeking refuge abroad, all while facing discrimination and persecution.

Systematic Discrimination: The Taliban's rule has enforced a system of systematic discrimination against non-Pashtun ethnic groups, with Hazaras bearing the brunt of this discrimination. Hazara individuals are often denied access to education, employment, and basic services, further marginalizing them within their own homeland.

Gender-Based Oppression: Women in the so-called Afghanistan, including Hazara women, have suffered immensely under the Taliban's rule. Strict dress codes, limited mobility, and restrictions on their participation in public life have stripped them of their basic human rights.

Cultural Erasure: Beyond the physical destruction of historical monuments, the Taliban's rule has also sought to erase Hazara cultural identities by suppressing their language, music, and arts. This cultural erasure contributes to the loss of the Hazara heritage.

International Response: The international community has condemned the Taliban's actions and called for accountability for their human rights abuses. However, meaningful intervention has been limited, and the Hazara continue to face grave threats to their existence.

The resurgence of the Taliban in the so-called Afghanistan has brought about a horrifying assault on fundamental rights, particularly for the Hazara people. The genocide of the Hazara, the destruction of their historical and cultural identities, and the suppression of their religious freedom and basic rights are grave injustices that demand international attention and intervention. Addressing these atrocities and providing protection and support for the Hazara and other marginalized communities in the so-called Afghanistan is essential to achieving lasting peace and justice in the region.

The Role of Pashtun Women in Lobbying for the Taliban and Their Enjoyment of Ethnic Privilege

The complex dynamics in the so-called Afghanistan involve not only the actions of male Taliban members but also the involvement of Pashtun women who actively lobby for the group. Their advocacy for the Taliban, rooted in their shared ethnic background, raises questions about the role of these women and the ethnic privilege they may enjoy.

Shared Ethnic Identity: Pashtun women who support the Taliban often emphasize their shared Pashtun ethnicity as a basis for their advocacy. They argue that the group represents the Pashtun community's interests and seek to legitimize their actions by framing them as ethno-nationalist struggles.

Perceived Ethnic Privilege: Some Pashtun women who lobby for the Taliban may enjoy certain forms of ethnic privilege within the Pashtun-majority areas where the group holds influence. This privilege can manifest in better access to movement, dress codes, employment, and social services compared to non-Pashtun communities.

From #Parwan to #Kabul 🚘 pic.twitter.com/AF6I42fbO2

— Diva Patang (@DivaPatang) September 28, 2023

Influence within the international community: Pashtun women who align themselves with the Taliban may hold influence within their own communities, including advocating for the group's policies and ideology. Their involvement can contribute to the perpetuation of the Taliban's agenda within Pashtun-majority areas. Since they have enjoy ethnic privilege and have access to financial and non-financial resources, they advocate the Pashtun nationalism under the name of ethnic majority, peace and even human rights.

Empowerment or Coercion: It is essential to consider whether Pashtun women's support for the Taliban is a result of personal empowerment and choice or if they are coerced into advocating for the group due to societal and familial pressures. In some cases, women may genuinely believe in the Taliban's cause, while in others, they may have limited agency in their decision-making.

Gender Dynamics within the Taliban: While some Pashtun women may lobby for the Taliban, it is crucial to recognize that the group's policies and actions have historically been repressive towards women. The Taliban's strict interpretation of Sharia law often curtails women's rights, limiting their access to education, employment, and public life.
Nuanced Perspective: It is important to avoid oversimplifying the role of Pashtun women who support the Taliban. Their motivations, experiences, and perspectives can vary widely, and not all Pashtun women align themselves with the group.

Balancing Ethnic Identity and Human Rights: The support of Pashtun women for the Taliban raises a challenging ethical question. While individuals have the right to express their ethnic and cultural identities, it becomes problematic when this support contributes to human rights abuses, violence, and the marginalization of non-Pashtun communities.

The Need for Dialogue: Promoting open and inclusive dialogue within Pashtun communities and across ethnic lines is essential to address the complexities of ethnic identity and privilege. Such dialogue can help bridge divides and promote understanding among different ethnic groups and nations in the so-called Afghanistan.

Pashtun women's role in lobbying for the Taliban, often rooted in their shared ethnic identity, is a complex issue that requires careful consideration. While they may enjoy certain ethnic privileges in Pashtun-majority areas, it is crucial to acknowledge the diverse motivations and experiences of these women. Balancing the expression of ethnic identity with the protection of human rights is a challenge that the so-called Afghanistan and the international community must address as they seek to build a more inclusive and equitable society.

Questionable Recognition: PRIO and the Nobel Peace Prize's Contribution to Injustice and Human Rights Abuses

The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) is an institution known for its involvement in the field of conflict resolution and peace studies. However, its actions regarding the so-called Afghanistan, particularly in relation to nominations for the Nobel Peace Prize, have faced criticism due to concerns that they may indirectly contribute to injustice and human rights abuses.

The Nobel Peace Prize has a long history of being awarded to individuals and organizations that have made significant contributions to promoting peace,human rights,and social justice. However,the recent nomination of Mahbooba Siraj has sparked concerns about the merit of nominees pic.twitter.com/ZbPDRmcApZ

— Hazara Women Global Movement (@HazarawomenGm) February 22, 2023

Lack of In-Depth Understanding: PRIO's involvement in nominating individuals from so-called Afghanistan for the Nobel Peace Prize has raised concerns about the institute's understanding of the complex dynamics in the region. The nomination of Mahbooba Seraj without a comprehensive understanding of her affiliations and potential roles in supporting the Taliban can inadvertently contribute to the promotion of groups associated with human rights abuses.

Legitimizing Controversial Figures: Nominating individuals with ties to Pashtun ethno-nationalism or groups that have been implicated in human rights abuses, even unintentionally, can be seen as providing legitimacy to these actors. Such recognition can be perceived as an endorsement of their actions and may further complicate efforts to address injustices in the so-called Afghanistan.

Stimulating Ethnic Divisions: PRIO's nominations, if perceived as biased or favoring one ethnic group over others, can exacerbate ethnic divisions in so-called Afghanistan. This can hinder peacebuilding efforts and contribute to an environment of mistrust and animosity among different ethnic communities and nations.

The Role of Independent Research: Organizations like PRIO play a crucial role in shaping public perception and international discourse. When their nominations are perceived as biased or lacking rigorous research and analysis, it can undermine the credibility of independent research and perpetuate misconceptions about the situation in the so-called Afghanistan.

Taliban Supporter Seraj

Ethical Responsibility: Organizations involved in peace and conflict research, such as PRIO, have an ethical responsibility to ensure that their actions do not inadvertently support or legitimize actors involved in human rights abuses. Nominations for prestigious awards like the Nobel Peace Prize should be based on thorough and impartial assessments.

Impact on Peace Efforts: The unintended consequences of PRIO's actions, such as potentially emboldening groups linked to the Taliban, can undermine peace efforts in the so-called Afghanistan. Achieving lasting peace requires a nuanced understanding of the situation, and the recognition of individuals or groups without such understanding can hinder progress.

Balancing Recognition and Accountability: PRIO, like other organizations, faces the challenge of balancing the recognition of individuals or groups working toward peace with accountability for human rights abuses. It is essential for organizations to be vigilant and exercise due diligence when making nominations or endorsing individuals for prestigious awards.

The Role of Influential Pashtuns and the Circulation of False Information about So-Called Afghanistan

In the complex and often turbulent landscape of the so-called Afghanistan, influential Pashtuns have played significant roles in shaping international perceptions, policies, and narratives. However, some of these influential figures have been accused of misrepresenting facts and circulating false information, particularly concerning other ethnic groups like the Hazara.

Historical Influence: Pashtuns have historically held positions of power and influence in the so-called Afghanistan, contributing to the shaping of the nation's political and social dynamics. This historical dominance has allowed some influential Pashtuns to exert considerable influence over the country's narrative.

Circulation of False Information: Some influential Pashtuns have been criticized for perpetuating false information or narratives that favor their own ethnic group while undermining or misrepresenting the experiences and histories of other communities, such as the Hazara.

Ethnic Propaganda: In the context of the so-called Afghanistan, where ethnic tensions have often played a role in the conflict, the circulation of ethnic propaganda by influential Pashtuns can exacerbate divisions and contribute to misunderstandings among different communities.

International Policy Impact: Influential Pashtuns who have close ties to international actors can influence the formulation of foreign policies and narratives about the so-called Afghanistan. This can have significant consequences, as policies and perceptions based on false information may lead to unintended outcomes.

Misleading Narratives: Some influential Pashtuns have framed issues in a way that portrays their own ethnic group as victims and other ethnic groups as aggressors or troublemakers. This distortion of facts can hinder efforts to address the root causes of conflict and human rights abuses.

Ethnic Hegemony: The actions of influential Pashtuns may be seen as attempts to maintain or reinforce ethnic hegemony within the so-called Afghanistan. This can create a hostile environment for non-Pashtun communities, such as the Hazara, and perpetuate inequalities.

Undermining Peace and Reconciliation: False information and misleading narratives can hinder peace and reconciliation efforts in the so-called Afghanistan. By misrepresenting the experiences of different ethnic groups, influential Pashtuns may inadvertently undermine the trust-building necessary for lasting peace.

Ethical Responsibility: Influential Pashtuns, like all leaders and figures of authority, have an ethical responsibility to ensure that the information they share is accurate, fair, and impartial. Misrepresenting facts can lead to unnecessary conflict and suffering.

The resurgence of the Taliban and the maintenance of Pashtun ethnic hegemony in the so-called Afghanistan are not isolated incidents. Well-educated and influential Pashtuns, such as Zalmay Khalilzad, have played significant roles in shaping the country's political landscape. Their intentional involvement has contributed to the challenges faced by non-Pashtun communities.

Conclusion

The situation in the so-called country Afghanistan is fraught with complexities related to ethnic tensions, gender disparities, and the resurgence of the Taliban. To address these issues effectively, it is essential to acknowledge the systematic erosion of fundamental rights faced by non-Pashtun communities, particularly the Hazara. It is equally crucial to consider the role of Pashtun women who lobby for the Taliban and the implications of organizations like PRIO in the region. Only through a nuanced understanding of these dynamics can we hope to foster peace, justice, and equitable rights for all in the so-called Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Partition Is a Considerable Solution for Peace

Kabul Press - Investigative News & Analysis — 2022-01-26T11:06:12Z

Kabul Press^?: The return of the Pashtun Taliban to power has raised the discussion about the partition of Afghanistan again as one alternative besides a federal system to end long term and increasing war and systematic crimes such as genocide and forced displacement of non-Pashtuns, particularly the Hazara in the hand of Pashtun governments and terrorist groups such as the Taliban.
The debate Partition of Afghanistan that Kabul Press has started several years ago and published dozens of articles about it is now of the hottest topics in so-called country Afghanistan. On social media, after every crime committed by the Taliban or in the former corrupt government of Ahmadzai, many react and write about partition as the only permanent and reliable solution.
“Pashtun culture that jail women and invades the lands of non-Pashtun is not in our culture. Enough is enough living with those who kill us every day.” Such comments and posts on social media are increasing and becoming more common.

Flags of Hazara, Tajik, Turks and Baloch

The Pashtuns are initially from some northern parts of Pakistan and northeastern parts of India. In the last two centuries, as they attacked non-Pashtuns and invaded their lands, the name Afghanistan also appeared on the map. Afghan, which is considered as a fake identity for non-Pashtuns in their language Dari means cry, and Afghanistan means crying land.
In several periods, none-Pashtuns faced genocide. One of them is the last decade of the 19th century when Afghans or Pashtuns massacred over 63% of the Hazara and invaded most parts of their land. Another example was during the Nazi regime in Germany when Afghans were sending high-ranking envoys to meet Nazi leaders as their big Arian race brothers; many non-Pashtuns, including the Tajik and Uzbek, besides the Hazara, were facing the crimes in the hand of Pashtun rulers.
The systematic crimes against non-Pashtuns are not limited to the massacre but also cultural genocide. The Pashtun rulers and groups such as the Taliban destroyed the cultural heritages, including the Buddhas of Hazaristan, banned the celebration of Nawruz, and forced the middle-aged culture Pashtunwali as the national culture for all.
Considering the systematic crimes, many experts from non-Pashtun people strongly believe that long-term war is not over until non-Pashtuns gain their right to self-determination.
Among non-Pashtuns are also some with conservative positions, offering the federal system as an alternative.

Ten Facts That Biden, Harris, Blinken and Austin Should Know About So-Called Afghanistan

Kabul Press - Investigative News & Analysis — 2021-03-21T09:31:00Z

1. Taliban and other terrorist groups raised among Pashtun tribes act as the military arms of Pashtunism, and their main policy is to invade non-Pashtuns' land. Their popular slogan is Tajiks to Tajikistan, Uzbek to Uzbekistan, Turkmen to Turkmenistan, and Hazara to goristan/graveyard.

2. It is over a century of war in the so-called country Afghanistan, but the western politicians and media like to say four decades, since the Soviet invasion.

3. Pashtun dictator Abdurrahman has signed the Durand line agreement to accepted this line as the official border of the so-called country Afghanistan and British-India (Pakistan) in 1983. This happened after the genocide of the Hazara and Nuristanis. Pashtun tribes do not recognize this border now, and at the same time, they respect Abdurrahman as he could kill over 63% of the Hazara population and invade most parts of their land.

4. Selling and buying Pashtun suicide bombers is a big market in tribal areas of the so-called country Afghanistan and Pakistan.

5. Pashtun tribes produce the biggest part of the world's poppy, and a big part of this drug business goes to the Taliban. There is no any intention by the Pashtunist government to stop this business.

6. The Pashtunist government of Afghanistan and officials such as Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, Hanif Atmar, and Mohammed Masoom Stanekzai are Taliban's supporters based on their common ethnic affiliation.

7. The government of Afghanistan is illegal and is the result of fraud and the US and UK interventions.

8. The story of the majority and minority in Afghanistan is fake. There is no reliable statistic nor national census.

9. Afghan and Afghanistan can not be identity and name for most people and their country. Most people have Dari as their native language, the word Afghan means cry in Dari. Awgho, Awghan or Afghan is another name for Pashtun ethnic group.

10. Many people believe in the Partition of the so-called country Afghanistan or a federal system.

Flags pictured by Jafar Rezai

The Political Aspects of APTTA

Dr. Hussain Yasa — 2021-01-31T06:37:46Z

Abstract

The APTTA renewal between Pakistan and Afghanistan has always increased concern in the light of developing political scenario. This article evaluates the forthcoming challenges and hurdles during the renewal process of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA). The agreement expires on February 11, 2021. The article evaluates the two major hurdles
A) First, the technical and procedural problems, like cessation of informal trade, effective usage of Information Technology (tracking devices of goods, vehicular tracking systems etc.), banking guarantees, and special bonded carrier licenses for transit trucks, container security deposits, and all other logistics and customs procedures, better working relationship and communication between the relevant authorities.
B) Political and security concerns of both parties, particularly Pakistan. The first set of problems seems to be negotiated smoothly but the second problem might be a real bone of contention. It is the inclusion of India into this agreement or at least the provision of Indian access to Afghanistan via Wagah Border. On this issue, both Afghanistan and Pakistan stand on opposite sides.

Introduction

In spite of sharing the longest border, having much in common in religion, culture and language on both sides of the border, naturally locked in interdependency in the various key areas like economy and security, both Pakistan and Afghanistan could never acquire a smooth level of relationship.
The root causes of this discontent in the mutual relations between both neighbors have varying perceptions in their geopolitical realm, sometimes difficult to sum it up in a small article. But the fact cannot be denied that both countries geographically locked into each as neighbors will keep affecting a degree of consensus, though at times an uneasy one, in terms of security policy and economic cooperation between both the states. Notwithstanding the fact that both governments could not maintain a desirable level of relations, still millions of legal and illegal refugees prefer Pakistan as their second home and tens of thousands of Afghan children are being educated there. In addition to that thousands more are busy in licit and illicit businesses in Pakistan.
No doubt that Pakistan and Afghanistan have their own unique geopolitical and geo-economic strategic importance, it would be improper for both countries to undermine the other. Pakistan is a junction of South Asia, West Asia and Central Asia with ample of coastline along the Arabian Sea which is of high importance and enables it to be an important hub for the transit trade to Afghanistan, china and the CARs. On the other hand, Afghanistan, though a landlocked country, has been known as a cultural crossroads of the Indian, Persian and Chinese civilizations, it has significant geostrategic and geopolitical importance by connecting East and West Asia or the Middle East to Central Asia, not to mention that it is the home of approx. over one trillion US dollars' worth of untapped precious mineral deposits.

If Pakistan has one of the largest armies in the world and it is the only Islamic nuclear power state, the dilemma occurs when lasting peace in Afghanistan is only possible with mutual security consensus between both the states but for Pakistan not compromising on its own geopolitical concerns in the changing security, political and geo-economic dynamics of the region, the vicious cycle of instability seems to remain unresolved. As for Afghanistan, being the heart of Asia, as the poet of the East Allamah Muhammad Iqbal acknowledged it; its destabilization bears direct consequences on the region. In other words, Afghanistan's instability factor alone would be enough to seek its nuisance among the regional players at least, if it could not do much to prove itself otherwise, particularly, when Afghanistan lacks the capacity to contain trans-border spillover of its internal security problems.

Both countries can play important role in the stability of South and Central Asia. Being a landlocked country, Afghanistan has been dependent on its neighbors for transit trade and the provision of the basic necessities, from food items, petroleum products up to basic medicines. Amid the continuous civil war, it still exports fresh and dried fruits, carpets and other textile floor covering. Although. In spite of the huge investment in blood and money by the international community over the last two decades, Afghanistan still faces a huge trade imbalance. According to the available data from WTO, the trade deficit of Afghanistan in 2018 was US$ 6.4 billion with US$ 1.2 billion imports and the exports were only US$ 485 million which is -32.72% of the GDP. In 2019, the situation improved a little bit and this deficit decreased to -30.11% of the GDP .

Pakistan, Iran, China and India are the main trading partners of Afghanistan. Till 2013 Trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan was at its peak by US$ 2.1 Billion but after that, the graph shows a decline in the mutual trade between the two countries. At the moment, Pakistan is the top export partner of Afghanistan with US$ 379million (43%) and India with US$ 359 million (41%) stay at number two but as far as imports are concerned Iran and China overtook Pakistan with US$ 1.26 billion and US$ 1.17 billion respectively. Pakistan stands third as the importing partner of Afghanistan by US$ 1.09 billion. Afghanistan's import from India is US$ 359.47 million.

From “ATTA” to “APTTA”

The first transit trade agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan signed on March 02, 1965. Although, it was a bilateral treaty but officially it was called “Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement” and according to that treaty Pakistan was not given the access to the then USSR while Afghanistan had the access to the ports of Pakistan, mainly the Karachi seaport which is the shortest and most cost-effective route to access the regional and the world market. In that agreement Afghanistan was not given the facility to access India by land route. For Pakistan the agreement was not balanced because it was not given reciprocal access to the USSR and after its collapse in the 90s, to the Central Asian Republics (CARs).

In the post-Taliban Afghanistan ATTA was replaced by the “Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement” which was signed by the commerce minister of both countries on October 28, 2010, in Kabul. This time the agreement was much more comprehensive with 58 articles and two annexes specifying exit-entry routes and four protocols with all the relevant technical and legal details.
By this agreement, Pakistan was given access to the CARs from three main points and Afghanistan was allowed access to Pakistan's seaports as well as to the Wagah Border for its exports to India but does not allow Indian Exports to Afghanistan through Wagah Land Border.
The international community and the United Nations welcomed and appreciated the agreement and called it a positive step toward the promotion of mutual trade and relations.
In addition to the traditional Red-Tapism and the corruption in border and customs authorities, there were always two problems that were raised time and again by both sides.
Pakistan was always concerned about the illegal and informal trade which costs Pakistan a huge sum of money annually as well as it had a bad impact on the Pakistani domestic industry and trade. It has been really a big challenge for Pakistan to control its more 2600 km porous border to control these illicit trade activities.
The second issue was Afghanistan's persistent demand that India should be given access for its exports to Afghanistan through Pakistani land routes. Pakistan has never responded positively to this Afghan demand due to the legal aspects of the agreement as well as the security concerns.

Informal Trade

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Pakistan is uniquely challenged by the nexus between crime and the illegal economy due to its geographic location. The country's relations with its neighbors, particularly Afghanistan, are complicated by cross-border criminality, which in turn creates a thriving regional illegal economy orchestrated by complex informal and formal organized criminal networks of supplier rings, wholesalers, financiers, protectors and patrons. The situation within the region has implications for the broader global community as the risks created by illegal and criminal economic activities spread and multiply far beyond. For example, illegal drug trafficking risks human health globally; illegal trade that funds insurgencies poses not just local and regional security challenges but also to more distant locations. The report also says that Afghanistan's illicit trade is still the major source of income. While the illegal economy raises the cost for conducting legal economic activities, it also weakens states, threatens development opportunities, undermines the rule of law, and keeps countries trapped in a cycle of poverty and instability.

A research paper by the Pakistan Strategy Support Program (PSSP) writes the details that how the goods destined for Afghanistan under the APTTA, upon arrival at the Karachi port, pay no duties, after which they are loaded onto trucks that transit Pakistani territory to reach Afghanistan via Chaman or Torkham (border crossing points). After arrival in Afghanistan, the merchandise is smuggled back to Pakistan.

According to CIDOB, the informal (non-opium) trade including smuggling (electronics, car parts, semi-precious stones, carpet, livestock, and foodstuffs). Informal trade reportedly accounts annually for US$ 1.5 billion, with smuggling accounting for US$1 billion. The same report mentions that “Lack of justice and rule of law, of which informal economies are a part, are a greater threat to Afghanistan than insurgency”.
Abdul Razak Dawood, the adviser to the Pakistani Prime Minister on Commerce and Investment depicts more serious situation. As said by him, the volume of informal trade between the countries was UD$ 2 billion in 2019.

But bad news for the smugglers and the people engaged in illegal trade across the Pak-Afghan border, Inter-Services Public Relations, or ISPR (The media wing of the Pakistan Army) said that the barrier has already been installed along “about 83 percent” of the western Pakistani frontier. Additionally, hundreds of new outposts and forts have been built under the roughly $500 million program. The project was started in 2017 to block militant infiltration, smuggling, and other illegal crossings on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Under the military-led border management project, Islamabad has also upgraded several formal crossings with Afghanistan to further facilitate bilateral and transit trade activities.

In spite of the serious blames that Pakistan is not doing more against the infiltration of terrorists across the border, the Afghan government didn't welcome this Pakistani measure and called this fencing illegal. Kabul still unilaterally claims that a huge area inside Pakistan belongs to Afghanistan and presently occupied by Pakistan.

The Afghan Ministry of Borders and Tribal Affairs, in its official website, doesn't recognize the borders between Afghanistan as legal and calls it “Malicious Durand Line”. Another dilemma overshadowing Pak-Afghan Relations in all areas of mutual cooperation.

APTTA and India

In fact, after the partition of British India into two states of India and Pakistan in 1947, Afghanistan never had good relations with Pakistan. The ethnocentric approach of the consecutive Kabul governments toward the Durand line and territorial claim over a vast area in Pakistan has been the main obstacle in building a good working relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. With the utopian vision of a greater Pashtunistan or Afghanistan, India was a better ally to rely on. India also did not mind it to be accommodated in Afghanistan, in the immediate neighborhood of its hostile neighbor Pakistan. But for Pakistan, the Indian presence on both Eastern and Western borders has always been a matter of concern.
In brief, this negative trend in low-level relations between the two neighbors dominates all areas from politics to economy.
For India, there are only two roads leading to Afghanistan and onward to the reasonably sized CARs market and access to their natural resources. The distance between Wagah (Indian Border) to Torkham is only 588.4 km and from there to the capital, Kabul is only 228.4 km. It means the total distance from the nearest Indian border to Kabul is 816.8 km. Considering the unfriendly relations with Pakistan, in particular, the long-lasting issue of Kashmir, it is almost impossible for India to access this route to Afghanistan without the solution of the key issues with Pakistan.
The other issue which is seriously disturbing India is the expanding project of “The One Belt One Road Initiative” led by China and its Southern extension, the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). The CPEC is not only an important part of the Chinese-led global economic project but also a game-changer in the region which enables China to access and dominate the maritime politics of the Indian Ocean. The total distance via land route between Gwadar, the main hub of the CPEC to the “Khunjarab”, the Chinese border is only 2757 km.
If India would search for another alternative route to reach Afghanistan and ultimately to CARs, it has only one option, that is Iran. The Iranian port of “Chabahar” is said to be the potential competitor of Gwadar and no doubt that it is also an important port strategically.
To bypass Pakistan, years before the APTTA is signed, India has started a key highway project of Zaranj-Dilaram Highway (Route 606). This 215km long highway connects Iran to the Kabul-Herat highway, the only and the key route of Afghanistan, connecting Herat to Kabul and onward to northern Afghanistan. This ambitious project was started in 2005 and completed in 2009. The highway is constructed by the Building and Road Organization of India (BRO) and it cost US$ 125 million.
On January 22, 2009, Hamid Karzai, the former Afghan President, and Pranab Mukherji, who was serving as the Indian FM at that time, participated in the inauguration ceremony of route 606. Both leaders, in their speeches, talked about the benefits of the project and its probable impact on the regional integration but some parts of both speeches were said to be provocative. Mukherji said, “The completion of the road reflects the determination of both India and Afghanistan that nothing can prevent or hinder collaboration between the two countries" and Karzai was two steps ahead, he said, “the completion of the project, which opens a shorter alternative route connecting Kabul to Iran, is a message to those who want to stop cooperation between India and Afghanistan. “Our cooperation will not stop .”
On May 23, 2016, India, Iran, and Afghanistan signed a trilateral transit trade deal in Tehran. This transit trade pact was inked in the presence of Narendra Modi, Hassan Rohani, and Ashraf Ghani, all three heads of states.
In the same visit, Indian PM announced that India would invest US$500 million to develop the strategically important Chabahar port, close to Iran's border with Pakistan, he said that the port would open a transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia for Indian goods and products, avoiding the land route through Pakistan. The Iranian business daily, Ta'adol, also welcomed the deal. It said that India wants to challenge China's power in central and South Asia through Chabahar port. Noting that China is trying to control the pulse of regional trade by making extensive investments in the Pakistani port of Gwadar, India is now positioned against its strong competitor by investing in the port. The newspapers reminded its readers of ‘setbacks' that Iran has faced due to India, “We should raise our complaints… and ask them [India] to be more honest in their trade with Iran, and to fulfill their obligations more seriously,” Another Iranian daily E'temad added that Mr. Modi's visit and the signing of agreements on joint projects, energy and connectivity will ring danger bells in Islamabad, China, and Riyadh.
Indian newspapers called the deal a milestone and a strategic defeat of Pakistan as well as the potential to provide an Indian strategic counter to Pakistan's Gwadar port being developed by China right next door to Chabahar.

The Iranian daily's concerns came true when the U.S. President Donald Trump overturned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and imposed rigorous sanctions on Iran in 2018. India could not continue with Iran, the way Iran counted on it.
Iranian Foreign minister, Zawad Zarif conveyed to his Indian Counterpart that Iran had expected the Modi government to be ‘more resilient' in the face of Washington's bullying at a time when equally Modi government was dragging its feet on the Chabahar port project, which has far-reaching implications for regional connectivity, stability, and security. In fact, Zarif reflected the deep misgivings at the highest level of Iranian leadership that India's capacity or political will to pursue independent foreign policies are increasingly in doubt.
On the other hand, a partnership with the US to restrain China was also attractive for India. The table moved further around after the two-day visit of Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) in India on February 29, 2019. The visit was followed by a UD$ 100 billion Saudi investment in Indian in the areas of energy, refining, petrochemicals, infrastructure, agriculture, minerals, and mining.
This strategic shift in both Indian and Saudi foreign policy was received with great concerns in all three relevant countries, Pakistan, Iran, and China.
As a logical percussion in August 2020, a piece of breaking news about the Chino-Iran mega-deal of US$ 400 billion through a strategic partnership, over the next 25 years rattled not only the Indian policymakers but also the western countries. Now, Iran did not need any more Indian investment in Chabahar port, the crucial railway line from Chabahar to Zahedan that ultimately connects the Iranian port to Zaranj nor the Iranian were eager for Indian money to explore the Farnaz B gas field. India started feeling to be footed out of the deal and the ambitious approach to access Afghanistan and the CARs. India wooed Iran to keep China away from Chabahar. Although Iran had a very diplomatic and soft response to India but a former Iranian diplomat, who served in India, said New Delhi's “growing ties” with the US and Israel under the Narendra Modi government have “not gone down well with Tehran. ” But it seems to be too late.

Another angle

Now, how the APPTA could be an important factor for both countries to preserve their geopolitical/economic importance and guarantee the prosperity of the people in both countries. Although, Pakistan continued to disallow the transit of Indian exports to Afghanistan via its land routes due to multidimensional political, security, legal and technical problems. But it allows exports of fresh fruits, vegetables, and herbs from Afghanistan to India through the Wagah land border. It means Afghanistan does not have any problem with its exports from Pakistan. Over and above to India and the rest of the world, Pakistan itself has been the favorite destiny of Afghanistan's fresh fruits and vegetables with minimal spoilage and without losing its natural taste and freshness. Fresh fruits and vegetables comprise a big percentage of the total Afghan export. According to the paper, AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL EXPORT STRATEGY 2018-2022, FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES SECTOR published Afghan Ministry of Industry and Commerce, over 90% of Afghan fresh fruits and vegetables are consumed in Pakistan, US$ 71.5 million and it is predicted an increase of 45% in coming years. Moreover, there is a high demand for Afghan coal in Pakistan. Only one company ‘Fauji Cement Company ltd.' requires up to 324,000 metric tons of Afghan coal per annum.

Now, let us explore two more important issues related to APTTA.
1. The Chabahar Port indeed bypasses Pakistan and if the other issues did not overshadow the Indo-Iranian relations, as it is discussed earlier, India may have access to Afghanistan but the main destination of India is CARs and beyond that. Why India would use Afghanistan as a transit route while Iran has better infrastructure, better roads, railway lines, and better management bodies, as well as there, are no security threats, it operational in all seasons and the no hard terrain to cross. So, the importance of Afghanistan as a crossroad and a connecting hub will be badly affected which will have a long-run effect. India will certainly use the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). It is the ship, rail, and road route for moving freight between India, Russia, Iran, Europe, and Central Asia. The INSTC project was initiated by Russia, India, and Iran in September 2000 in St. Petersburg. The trilateral agreement was signed on May 16, 2002, at least one-half decades earlier than the India-Iran-Afghanistan trade transit agreement.

2. Another agreement ‘The Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA)' was signed by Pakistan, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan on March 09, 1995, in Islamabad, 15 years earlier than the APTTA. Later on, in 2017 Tajikistan also wished to join this agreement while Kabul has reluctant to finalize a transit trade agreement with Islamabad. Tajikistan is poised to join a separate initiative that will connect Pakistan to Central Asia, bypassing Afghanistan entirely. The QTTA provides Pakistan an alternative gateway to Central Asia by completely circumnavigating Afghanistan. It would use the Karakoram Highway which connects Gilgit-Baltistan to China's Xinjiang region, which links to Central Asia. On May 08 2020, the Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister, Sardor Umurzakov also submitted a formal request. The road will provide Uzbekistan access to China and the Pakistani seaports. Now, this project is part of CPEC and is operational. This transit route is also bypassing Afghanistan. Although, the road passing from the tough mountainous areas and the traffic might face problems, it the same case with the Kabul-Mazar-e Sharif highway when it passes through Salang Mountains and Tunnel.

Concluding Remarks

1. All knows the undesirable fluctuating relationship between both neighbors but both have to overcome those problems as soon as possible; lest it will undermine all facets of relation from trade to peace and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

2. APTTA has more implications beyond mutual trade. If, Afghanistan cannot incorporate the region economically by this project; it should not lose Pakistan and CARs. If APTTA is not signed Afghanistan may lose its leverage as the crossroad of the region. The countries all around Afghanistan, which are much more stable economically and politically may find their way for mutual trade with or without Afghanistan. The two examples of INSTC and QTTA projects, respectively led by Russia and China are already discussed above.

3. No doubt that India is an important country in the region but the persistent pressure of Kabul to include India in the APTTA does not seem to be materializing. Since the mutual relations between Pakistan and India have their own dynamics and history, until they do not resolve their problems of considering each other an existential threat, APTTA has to move forward with or without India. India cannot export to Afghanistan via Wagah and Pakistan land route but the government of Pakistan has given Afghanistan a special dispensation to export Afghan Goods to India.

4. India has already found another trade route for its exports to Afghanistan and CARs., Afghanistan does not need to worry about that.

5. Although one can realize the immense pressure on president Ghani, Afghanistan really a hard land to rule with the history of the four-decade war. At present, the issues of his lavish dining table with fourteen various types of meet and the deadlock in Doha Talks might be matters of more importance but APTTA is also a matter that should be dealt with on a priority basis.

Afghanistan Trade Balance 1960-2021
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https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/india-hands-over-strategic-zaranj-delaram-highway-to-afghan/story-WSbFNMguMWjvY39V7fR46H.html
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AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL EXPORT STRATEGY 2018-2022
FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES SECTOR
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Fauji Cement Company ltd.
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How the Taliban Chose the Bullet Over the Ballot?

Dr. Hussain Yasa — 2020-11-07T16:01:08Z

Abstract

Insofar as the Taliban leadership has a vision of the state, it embodies the centralism of the current Afghan state, but with supreme power dominated by the Taliban which is perhaps under the cover of a clerical council to select the national leader.
The Taliban vision of the state embodies a form of sectarian exclusiveness. They posit their movement as the guardian of self-interpreted Sunni Hanafi tradition and deny all other diverse people a place in the state.
And, in their struggle to capture and transform the state, the Taliban have explicitly rejected the ideas of pluralism and power-sharing. The Taliban have been explicit in their intention to rule alone, with no need to respect pluralism.
But, in pursuing these goals, the Taliban have prioritized the use of force and have refused to embrace constitutional politics. They have in effect chosen the path of the bullet over the ballot.
This hard-liner approach of Taliban also jeopardized the hope for a positive outcome from the peace talks in Doha.

Preface

So far, no substantial progress in Doha Intra-Afghan Talks can be observed after it began on September 12, 2020. Hitherto, there have been only ceremonial meetings with the formal pleasantry exchange of views, reiterating the will for the success of talks.
Keeping in view the complex nature of the problem, no one expected quick results but indeed, it is disappointing that the negotiating team of the self-proclaimed Islamic Emirates, the Taliban and the Republican delegates from Kabul could not yet finalize the procedural rules and agendas of the talks. One can truly realize the difficulties ahead. The crucial issues like the probable future contour of the polity, governance, Shariah and civic values are on pending as the real bones of contention.
On the other hand, the recent wave of high level of widespread violence has also negatively impacted bilateral peace agreement between the Taliban and the US, signed on February 29, 2020.
October 2020 was one of the bloodiest months. In Helmand, dozens from both sides including many civilians lost their lives and much more injured as well as thousands of families were displaced internally. The US Air Force bombarded Taliban to stop their advance toward the Lashkar Gah – the provincial capital. Taliban raised its serious objection against the US action in favor of Kabul government and called it a serious violation of the bilateral agreement while the US rejected the claim and warned the Taliban to honestly bind to the agreement regarding the reduction in violence. Instead of heeding the US envoy, from Helmand the Taliban marched on to Kandahar.
On October 18, 2020, a car bomb attack on the police headquarter in Firozkoh, capital of Ghor, killed 18 and more than 150 were wounded. Most of the casualties were civilians – the women, children and students from the deaf and dumb education center nearby.
On October 24, 2020, an education center in Western Kabul was targeted that killed dozens of children while over 150 were wounded. Although, Daesh (ISIS-K) claimed the responsibility, the civil society, political parties and Afghan government have raised their finger towards Taliban.
On November 02, 2020, again Kabul University was attacked in which, according to health officials, 19 people, including students and a teacher, were killed and 22 others were injured. Again, Daesh claimed responsibility for the attack. According to Ministry of Interior official, the attack on Kabul University ended after six hours after killing three attackers.

Hurdles so far

The issue of recognition of the Shi'ite religion for its followers which comprise around 20% of the whole population of Afghanistan and forms the legal basis of the ongoing talks have been the main areas of dispute.
The Taliban insist that the guiding principles of the ongoing talks should be based on the bilateral agreement between the Taliban and the US signed on February 29, 2020. In which four important issues were agreed upon, the withdrawal of US troops, counter-terrorism cooperation between the US and the Taliban, a reduction in violence and ultimately a ceasefire, and the initiation of the intra-Afghan negotiations. Kabul's delegation insists that the US-Afghan joint declaration signed on the same day should also be recognized. Taliban are reluctant to agree to any document that recognizes Kabul administration as legitimate.
The Republican Team from Kabul raises the point that how could it be possible to accept a bilateral agreement as the guiding principle in which they were not involved. To some extent, their claim seems to be logical as they were bypassed in the agreement by their main supporter – the US.
In addition, there seems to be a wide gap between the approaches of both sides with regards to the various terminologies which have deep political and religious meanings. Like “Jihad or conflict” or “Social Justice or Islamic Justice”, Taliban believe that their armed struggle has been a justified “Jihad” on the path of God while delegates from Kabul deny this claim and call it a “conflict”.
The delegates from Kabul stress that the future political system should be based on “Social Justice” while Taliban call it a western term and insist that it should be replaced with the Islamic term “Islamic Justice”.
Like many Afghans, the US is also frustrated with this stalemate since it is also eagerly waiting for a fruitful ending of this talks, probably for certain reasons. After weeks of deadlock, the two sides were reported to have accepted a role for the Qatari government as facilitator, assisted by diplomats of the other countries present at the talks. Although, the Taliban promptly distanced themselves from this.
Some of the delegates suggest that the problematic issues should not be discussed at the beginning, rather should be left for later but again the remaining issues regarding the ceasefire or so-called reduction in violence could be more stupefacient. It has proved to be the main card used as an effective tool by the Taliban over the last two decades. On this issue again, Taliban are not ready to simply relinquish their main leverage on just a good faith. And the most importantly, the Taliban's unclear stand on the probable future contour of the polity is still on pending to discuss. There are so many other issues with the controversial technical, ideological and political aspects on this difficult path to bring Taliban into the main stream politics under the single roof with all other diverse groups with different political and ideological point of view.
The fact remains that the Taliban have so far confined themselves only to the vague terminologies like Islamic System, Islamic Justice or Islamic Shariah.
Although Taliban are not showing their cards, one can foretell the probable silhouette of the future political system. But what exactly? Do they have any model from the present-day Islamic countries or from the past?
In negotiations, Taliban have avoided laying out their preferred system of Islamic government. However, previous Taliban stances and other historic and contemporary cases of Islamic government provide clues as to what model the Taliban are likely to push for.

Is there any ideal model of polity in the Islamic history?

The rhetoric of Islamic form of government has been heard from many Islamic parties throughout the Islamic world but many political scientists believe that political systems and good governance have its own internationally recognized definitions and benchmarks, it has nothing to do with religion.
Great Islamic scholar, author as well as a known politician of the subcontinent Molauna Abul Ala Moudoodi (1903-1979) believes that with the end of Rashidun Khilafat on 29 January 661 with the martyrdom of Hazrat Ali, Islamic rule officially converted from Khilafat to Mulookiyat means “Kingship” (mulk instead of truly khilafa)).
In this regard, it is to be mentioned that the Umayyad caliphs referred to themselves not as khalifat Rasul Allah (“successor of the messenger of God,” the title preferred by the tradition), but rather as khalifat Allah (“deputy of God”). Thus, the alien concept of hereditary succession introduced against the earlier tradition. According to Moulana's thesis, this deviation from the basic teaching has brought about negative impact in the Islamic world and divided the elite in two classes: first, the ruling class and second, the people who were supposed to be the religious class.
The known Islamic scholar and author of many books in Kabul, Ali Amiri believes that “Quran and Sunna” do not recommend any specific political system and mode of governance, rather stand on certain values which promote social justice, equality and harmony in human societies. He says that democracy is not in contradiction with the basic guidelines of Islam and political systems should be based on the economic, political and other ground realities as the institutional guarantee for peace, harmony, stability and prosperity. According to his views, Islam does not oppose if Islamic societies get the best advantages of the human experiences in the fields of politics and governance.
The historical Islamic Empires were almost autocratic, Absolute Monarchies, Unitary in Nature and dominated by clan Aristocracy. The Shriah Law was nothing but an instrument to justify the kingships. (See Appendix 1)
The Mongol invasions that began in the 13th century drastically reconfigured the Islamic world. The invasions brought about the end of Arab Empire and the beginning of Turkic dynasties. The drastic change in the ruling class also did not change anything in governance qualitatively.

What about the present-day Islamic countries?

Expect for that of few, most of the Islamic countries have the modern constitutionalism. The “Shariah” plays a nominal role mixed with the European style Common Law as the base of their legal system. In most of these countries, the Shariah and modern concept of legal system are not intertwined through clear boundaries. But still their political systems are well-defined internationally. (See Appendix 2)
The concept of absolute monarchies has already lost its popularity worldwide including the Islamic World. Moreover, autocratic and aristocratic governments are disliked overwhelmingly among the Muslim population across the world.
Here is the real dilemma! Nor the Taliban ever indicated any Islamic country as their role model neither themselves presented a clear idea of statehood. In this regard, their concept seems to be under developed. But for sure, the Islamic countries with multiparty democracies, modern political systems or major portion of their judiciary depend on western civil laws cannot be acceptable for the Taliban.
Some aspects of the unique political systems of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran might be convincing for Taliban where Ulema have protagonist characters in politics and the judiciary has active role in the Islamization of legal system. Both Islamic countries have their own distinctive features in their political systems. It will be discussed in brief later on.

What are Taliban afraid of?

In Doha, the Kabul delegation has clear stance on the certain issues like, the political system, governance, democracy, elections, human and women rights, religious minorities, ethnic, lingual and cultural diversities and support for the enacted constitution which is mostly in accordance with the international conventions.
On the contrary, the Taliban do not seem to be vocal on these issues. Without going into the detail, all of their officials and spokespersons present Islam as the remedy of all odds. As well as, Taliban are trying to convince the relevant stakeholders that they are not the ones of 90s and they have a deep realization of changing world of 21st century with regards to the undeniable universal values.
Why do the Taliban speak on certain vital issues in vague terms? The probable reasons could be;
1. They do not want to be seen as an incompatible factor with the ground realities and some undeniable values, no one dares to comprise on, internationally. With countless efforts and graceful dealing of the Trump Administration through its envoy Khalilzad, Taliban are no more a terrorist group or rebels. Taliban do not want to remain as a blacklisted organization rather want to be recognized as a political entity. Taliban realize that tough stand on certain issues might change the views of the international backers of Afghanistan and they might turn their back once again. The strict Sharia law without accepting certain international benchmarks of governance, might not be acceptable for the involved domestic and international stakeholders. The Taliban have traveled a long way from being a top terrorist group to be recognized as an acceptable and negotiable political entity. Here comes the main dilemma that they cannot distance themselves from bullet and not in a position to deny the ballot, means the civic values and the popular pluralism.
2. If they would enter into procedural and institutional debates, they might lose control over their foot soldiers who are unfamiliar with such process and might revolt against their negotiators in Doha for closing an unholy deal with the people whom they never considered as good Muslims. The institutionalized terminologies for them are still “Amir-ul- Mominin” (The lord of the faithful), Sharia, Islamic System, Ulema (clergies), Jihad and mostly used terms for their opponents have been Kafars (infidels) or puppets/facilitators of occupying forces, the forces of evil and corruption (Shar-o-Fisad) etc. The common terms with the pre and postfix of “Islamic” has been a good mean to skip the complicated issues of modern governance.
3. Regardless of the strict religious approach, another important reason of Taliban's reluctance to accept the popular democracy is their understanding of the ground reality. They might be a military force with thousands of fighters but do not have a reliable vote bank. They might lose ballots miserably. Without the support of sword and terror, they might be lost with in a brief time.
4. The last but not the least, the Taliban realize that its fighters cannot be integrated in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), trained by the NATO and its partners. The foot soldiers of Taliban and their local commanders resemble medieval ill-organized crusaders and cannot be accommodated in the modern army. Their union could disintegrate one or both of them. In that case, the self-proclaimed Islamic Emirate might be the probable loser.
It is also to be mentioned here that the present form of political system of Afghanistan is not suitable for the deeply diverse Afghan social fabric. As well as domestically and internationally many institutions call the current system as dysfunctional. Even though, the notion of sword and blood of Taliban have been repulsive for the majority who believe in a sustainable peace with the accommodation of all sections of Afghan society in the system.

The probable dream of Taliban

Until now, the Taliban have denied any possibility of coalition set up with the current Kabul administration. It would negate all their earlier narratives based on self-defined Sharia by which they have mobilized thousands.
It seems that the Taliban want to build an ill-defined political system not as the continuation or by the reform of the current one, established with the wholehearted assistance of the International community and the longest engagement that has costed over a trillion USD.
One can easily make out what could be a favorable future scenario for the Taliban.
To prove that they were on the right side of the history with a just stance, it would be desirable scenario that they would emerge as victorious at the end of the day. They would certainly re-impose the misleading narrative that Afghans are impregnable and they have defeated the largest military power of the world.
On the contrary, Afghanistan has been a recognized serious challenge for the civilization and the US was never engaged in a fight with the intent to eliminate Taliban. It is also to be admitted that the consecutive Afghan governments have never been good partners with the US in this regard.

The probable model for Taliban

Among the Islamic Countries, there are only two, who claim to be pure Islamic, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some aspects of the political system of both these two countries might be striking for Taliban.

Saudi Model – The political system of KSA is based on absolute monarchy that was developed upon the system of belief of the Islam guided by, the descendants of “Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), the founder of the “Wahabi School of Thought”. In fact, the Saudi political system is also unique in its nature. Two families the “House of Saud” and the “House of Al Sheikh” who have 300 years old agreement to support each other. According to the agreement which was sealed between Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744, both Mohammads agreed that “Ibne Saud” will be the “Imam”, means political leader of the Muslims and “Ibne Wahab” will be the leader of the religious affairs. Thus the political and the religious establishments were divided between the two “Houses” respectively.
In brief, KSA has autocratic, clan aristocratic and bloodline hereditary system both politically and religiously. The King serves the two designations of the head of the state as well as the head of the government. KSA doesn't have elected parliament rather just a handpicked advisory council without the right of the primary legislation. Elections for local bodies are permitted in 2005 but women were given the right to vote only in 2015. To be brief, nor is the head of state elected neither the so-called parliament. Meanwhile, the religious leadership (Grand Mufti) is also hereditary. Economy is pumped by the oil and Sharia has been an instrument for the legitimacy of the kingdom.

Diagram- Political Power Structure of the KSA

Source: hierarchystructure.com

Iranian Model – Except for that of domination of Shiite Jurisprudent, Iranian political system might be much closer to the Taliban's idea as compare to the Saudi model.
“Iran's constitution establishes the nation as both a democracy and a theocracy, blending the liberal notion of popular sovereignty with oversight by the Guardian Council to ensure political candidates, laws and regulations adhere to Islamic practices.”
In Iran, there are multiple layers of power, but the real power lies in the hand of supreme leader. This highest post is reserved only for the top theologist with the authority of ruling (fatwa) in various fields of Islamic law (Fiqh – Islamic jurisprudence) (Article 109, Constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran).
The Guardian Council is a twelve-member body composed of six qualified Ulema nominated by the supreme leader and next half comprised specialists from different fields, are nominated by the head of the judiciary who are subjected to the approval of parliament (Article 91). On the other hand, the head of the judiciary is appointed by the supreme leader (Article 110/6-b). It means that in the appointed of Guardian Council member the Supreme Leader has a superior role.
This council is so powerful that without it, the elected parliament (Majlis) doesn't have any status (Article 93), it has the right to interpret the constitution (Article 98) and the power of veto against any bill which it considers not compatible with the Islamic Laws (Articles 94, 95 and 96).
The council organizes as well as supervise all the major elections for the president, Council of Experts of the leadership (That elect and dismiss the supreme leader), parliament and referendum (Article 99).
The Council of (Islamic) Expert of the leadership (Khibragan) is another powerful body that is composed of only high ranked religious scholars (Ulema) whose qualifications are also verified either by the Guardian Council or the Supreme leader himself. (Article 2- Electoral Law of the Council of Expert). In addition to that Guardian Council can vet/disqualify any candidate wants to contest the presidential or parliamentary elections or Council of (Islamic) Experts.
The next council is Expediency Discernment Council of the system composed of 39 handpicks of the Supreme Leader. It comprises again mostly the ulema but also technocrats loyal to the system. It is an advisory council to the Supreme Leader as well as the body resolves the conflict between the main bodies of the states (Article 12). The Supreme Leader may delegate some of his power to this council, if required.
Supreme Leader has the full control of the armed forces including 190,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The total size of Iranian armed forces with reserve units are estimated to be around 1, 060,000.

Diagram- The Power Structure of the Iranian Political System

Source: BBC

The Iranian Political System could be called a pure “Theocracy” with a democratic touch by a controlled electoral system.
Since, the Taliban now realize the importance of international donor as the lifeline for the crippled and donor dependent Afghan economy, they can't ignore some aspects of the predominant international benchmarks of the governance. They might agree to some sort of plural democracy with controlled local elections. On the other hand, the western world also does not expect from Taliban a political system and the governance that fit into their criteria. For the international mission, the honorable withdrawal is priority, they might agree to minimum standards of governance and probably would ignore human rights violations and other civic values like they are doing it in many Arab absolute monarchies.
The power structure of Iranian polity might be noteworthy for the Taliban but they lack an important aspect of an ideal theocracy. The theological foundation of Iran is not mixed with the tribalism. In spite of the fact that the “Fars” are 67-70% of the whole population, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, the longest serving head of state in the Middle East, belongs to the Azari ethnic group which comprise around 16% of the Iranian population. In addition to that, 11 members of Council of (Islamic) experts are Azaris. Ali Meshkini another Azari, from 1983 till his death in 2007 was the chairman of this council. There are 44 (of 290 in total) are representative of Azerbaijan region in the Iranian Parliament. The Grand Ayatullah Sayyid Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, ex-Prime Ministers, Mehdi Bazargan and Mir-Hossein Mousavi were also Azaris while Mehdi Karrubi the prominent opposition figure and ex-Speaker of the Iranian Parliament and the ex-Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, Mohsen Rezaee belong to Lor, ethnic group of Loristan. The powerful Larijani brothers are “Mazanis” from Mazendran.
The Sunni population of Iran, mostly the followers of the “Hanafi School of Thought” have been demanding for more representation in the executive posts. According to the CIA Factbook, their population is 5-10% of the total population.
On the contrary, the Sunnis of Afghanistan, most of them are followers of the same school of thought but from other ethnic, lingual and cultural groups have been resisting against the Taliban because of its deeply rooted tribal approach. Inside Afghanistan, the Taliban are seen as the symbol of backwardness rather than a religious group. The majority including the moderate Pashtuns don't agree with the version of Shariah of Taliban, badly mixed with the tribalism.
In Iran, there might be supremacy of Shiite jurisprudence but it recognizes not only all other Muslim school of thoughts but also non-Muslim like Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian have their own family laws (Article 11, 12 and 13 of Iranian Constitution), same as it is written in Afghan article 131 of enacted Afghan Constitution. In this regard too Taliban seem to be very rigid, the level of intolerance in their lines are witnessed to be higher than the general expectations.

Are these models applicable in Afghanistan of 21st century?

There is no doubt that like many Islamic countries, religion has been playing an important role in Afghan politics too but only the sacralization of politics by religious rhetoric cannot bring sustainable peace and ultimate stability. Rather, there is a desperate need of a system for the just allocation of power vertically and horizontally suitable for the deeply diverse country.
The models of Iran and KSA cannot be copied in Afghanistan. It will convert Afghanistan in an abandoned island, the region and the world community need an Afghanistan compatible with the rules of the game.
Afghanistan needs a viable political system which could promote harmony by its nature. Only a modern and recognized political system with good governance can save Afghanistan from another chaos in the decades ahead.
Afghanistan does not have unlimited time for getting through this havoc. It should get the best advantage of the world attention paid to it. Still, the international community did not disengage from Afghanistan completely. The regional countries have been showing positive signs to help Afghan settlement unanimously. But the continuous reluctance to tolerate each other institutionally through a workable prescription on relative modern lines might make all to leave Afghanistan alone.
No one can contest the view that current dysfunctional political system of Afghanistan needs an overhauling but it should be a step ahead. It cannot afford to once again experience the same model of governance that could not settle the internal sources of crises.

Appendix 1

Appendix 2 NOTES

Moudoodi, Molauna Abul Ala. Khilafat wa Malookiyat (in Urdu). Lahore: Idarat-ul-Tarjuman Quran, 1996.

Amiri, Ali. "Islam and the State (in Farsi)." The Daily Ittelaat Roz. October 12, 2020.
https://www.etilaatroz.com/108480/islam-and-republic-1/

“Terrorist Acts by Groups from 2013 to 2017.” Countrydata.info. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.laenderdaten.info/terrorismus/terrorgruppen.php

Al-Rasheed, Madawi – A History of Saudi Arabia, 2nd ed. London: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

“Saudi Arabia Political Hierarchy.” Hierarchy Structure. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.hierarchystructure.com/saudi-arabia-political-hierarchy/

Alem, Yasmin. Duality by Design: The Iranian Electoral System. Washington D.C: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2011.

“Iran Military Power.” Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). August 2019. https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf.

“Iran Who Holds the Power.” BBC online. Accessed November 5, 2020. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/supreme_leader.stm

“The Umayyad and Abbasid Empires.” Lumen Learning. Accessed November 5, 2020
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-worldhistory/chapter/the-umayyad-and-abbasid-empires/

“Spain.” New World Encyclopedia. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Spain #Muslim_conquest

Shuriye, Abdi O. “Explorations on the Abbasids Political Culture in Pursuit of Sustainable System of Governance in the Muslim World.” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 7, no.4 (2006): 235.

Grigoriadis, Theocharis N. “Compromising Islam with Empire: Bureaucracy and Class in Safavid Iran.” Iran & the Caucasus 17, no. 4 (2020): 371-382.

Maheshwari, Dr. V.K. “Aurangzeb – The Man Responsible for the Decline of Mughal Empire in India.” Word Press (blog). September 1, 2015. http://www.vkmaheshwari.com/WP/?p=2026

Hupchick, Dennis P. The “Ottoman System”. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

“Population of Indonesia by Province 1971, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2010.” Central Bureau of Statistics.
Accessed November 5, 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20171123162558/http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1267

“Population Census 2017.” Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. Accessed November 5, 2020. http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/provisional-summary-results-6th-population-and-housing-census-2017-0

“The Results of Address-based Population Registration System.” Turkish Statistical Institute. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://data.tuik.gov.tr/en/display-bulletin/?bulletin=the-results-of-address-based-population-registration-system-2019-33705

“General Population Census 2016.” Statistical Center of Iran. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.amar.org.ir/english

Buchta, Wilfried. “Who Rules Iran: The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic.” The Washington Institute. January 2000. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/who-rules-iran-the-structure-of-power-in-the-islamic-republic

“The Total Population in 2018.” General Authority for Statics: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20190403082640/https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/indicators/1

“2010 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia.” Department of Statistics, Malaysia. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php?r=column/cthemeByCat&cat=117&bul_id=MDMxdHZjWTk1SjFzTzNkRXYzcVZjdz09&menu_id=L0pheU43NWJwRWVSZklWdzQ4TlhUUT09#:~:text=The%202010%20Population%20and%20Housing,formation%20of%20Malaysia%20in%201963.&text=Census%202010%20revealed%20that%20the,in%202000%20(Chart%201).

“UAE Population 2017.” The Statistical Centre for the Cooperation Council for the Arab Countries of the Gulf (“GCC-Stat”). Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.gccstat.org/en/country-profile/ae

“The World Factbook: Middle East: United Arab Emirates.” Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ae.html

Ethnics of So-called Afghanistan: State Department and False Information

Kamran Mir Hazar — 2020-06-16T14:52:07Z

It is not the first time that the U.S departments and agencies circulate false information about the population of so-called country Afghanistan and its ethnic groups. In the latest report of the State Department on International Religious Freedom, it is stated that “According to the Pew Forum, Shia make up approximately 10-15 percent of the population. According to religious community leaders, the Shia population, approximately 90 percent of whom are ethnic Hazaras, is predominantly Jaafari, but it also includes Ismailis.” Many Hazara, including politicians and activists, reacted to the report, asking the U.S. State Department not to circulate false data when there is no transparent and comprehensive population census conducted in so-called Afghanistan.
According to Minority Rights Group International, the Hazara were once the largest ethnic group constituting nearly 67 percent of the total population of the state before the 19th century. According to the Hazara historians and many international researchers, about 62% of the Hazara massacred in the hand of Pashtun tribal leader Abdur Rahman and his Pashtun tribes in the last decade of 19th century, and most parts of Hazaristan such as Kandahar, Zabul, Helmand, Ghazni, and Oruzgan invaded. The Pashtun regimes and their radical groups such as the Taliban continue massacring the Hazara, however many Hazara believe that they make at least 30% of the population in so-called country Afghanistan.
The majority of Shias in so-called Afghanistan are indeed the Hazara, but the Hazara nation consists of a variety of religious and non-religious groups. According to the leaders of Sunni Hazara, the population of Sunni Hazara is at least five million living in Hazaristan, the Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik populated areas including South-Turkistan and the rest of so-called Afghanistan which mainly populated or invaded by Pashtun tribes. The majority of Ismailis in so-called Afghanistan are also the Hazara. There are also Buddhists, Christians, and non-religious among the Hazara, particularly among the young generation, many are humanists not practicing any religion.

While there is no transparent and comprehensive census, the Pashtunist governments tried to keep the power in the hand of Pashtuns by totalitarian governments or terrorist groups such as the Taliban besides falsifying the ethnic population and systematic frauds in the last elections. For instance, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, one of Pashtun politicians and supporters of the Taliban, states that the population of Bamyan in Hazaristan is approximately 100 000. However, putting statistics from the Education ministry and Election commission reveals that at least 350 000 who were able to vote (over 18 years old) and not able to vote (under 18 years old) in two last so-called presidential elections. Such falsified information about the Hazara is too much, mainly provided by Pashtunist governments and Pashtun agents of CIA. Any information about the quantity of the ethnic groups is not reliable and cannot be the source for research or actions such as the distribution of international aids to so-called Afghanistan.

Will the So-Called Country Afghanistan Reach to Prosperity With the Pashtuns?

Shamsuddin Mohammadi — 2020-05-19T05:03:03Z

So, eventually, what is the solution?

This is the question that comes to my mind every day. Thereupon I read the contemporary history of Afghanistan, where power has been held by Pashtuns for about three centuries. Pashtun leaders have repeatedly sought to Pashtunize the country (Khorasan). For example, the fertile-lands of the Hazaras in Helmand and Kandahar and other places seized and they faced forced migration! The Hazaras refuge to mountainous central areas.

As the power was constantly in the hands of Pashtuns, wealth and resources have always been given to the Pashtun areas. No resources or facilities have been provided in Hazara areas. As of now, if anyone takes a short trip to all over Kabul, will clearly see how deprived the Hazara areas are of government and national resources. The Hazaras always face prejudices and discriminations even till now!

Five Hazara Burned Alive by Pashtun Taliban

Qyāq Valley of Ghazni, Hazaristan
May 17, 2020

The type of system structure was changed from kingdom to absolute centralized presidency. That is, the president of the country takes all decisions alone. Because it has always been Pashtun's presidency(as if it is copyright), and national resources and national wealth have always been to the Pashtuns. If the change in the system brought up in the agenda, the Pashtun elites have immediately opposed it.

The genocide of the Hazaras during the reign of Abdul Rahman Khan, the enslavement and sale of Hazara women and men in the markets are clear hostility of Pashtuns. According to historians, more than 62 percent of the Hazara population was massacred by Abdul Rahman Khan's army, and a large part of the Hazara community forcibly migrated to Iran, Pakistan, and other countries. The mass killings of Hazaras are still continuing. The usurpation of fertile-lands in the north of the country and the transfer of Pashtuns in those areas occurred during the reign of King Zahir Shah. The country was officially renamed to Afghanistan by Ahmad Shah Abdali. The Kabuli rupee converted into Afghani and the Persian texts from banknotes removed and instead of that Pashto was written. The National Anthem is Pashto. Respectively, there are dozens of other examples of Pashtunization have taken place in the country of so-called Afghanistan. And so far it has continued.

Genocide and Slavery by Afghan/Pashtuns

Hawke's Bay Herald, Volume XXVIII, Issue 9508, 20 October 1893, Page 2

The only ethnic group that commits suicide attacks is the Pashtuns. The enslavement and sale of women among the Pashtun people are still common. Poppy cultivation and all kinds of drugs are promoted and produced among Pashtun farmers. The production of opium and trafficking of various hashish among Pashtuns is a common practice. Weapons are bought and sold as market goods among Pashtuns. Terrorists such as Taliban, Al-Qaeda, ISIS and others are growing among Pashtuns. The beds for any kind of terrorist ideology are thoroughly available within Pashtuns in all courses of times.

Buddhas of Bamyan, Hazaristan

Ancient monuments, historical buildings are destroyed by the Pashtuns. Asphalt roads are being destroyed by Pashtuns. The bridges are blown up by Pashtun. Schools are burned and blown up by Pashtuns. Obviously, every day the Pashtun -Taliban blast infrastructures throughout the country. Doctors, engineers, nurses, teachers and other welfare service providers are being killed by Pashtuns. Farmlands and vineyards are set on fire and destroyed. Girls and women are barred from going to schools and universities. Women are barred from going to offices. More than half of the population of Afghanistan are women; pushed to be passive and become housewives by Pashtuns.

The most recent case of anti-human and inhuman crime carried out by Pashtun-Taliban in a maternity hospital at the West of Kabul, where the residents are all Hazara. Many lives lost, including 20 mothers and many new-born babies were killed or wounded in the attack after minutes or hours of born. Such a brutal action can be expected only from Pashtun- Taliban in the twenty-one century!

I remember The Taliban slogan of 1998, when they were ruling over more than 95 percent of the territory of the country, is still resonant in my ears that they told that Afghanistan belongs to Pashtuns and saying that; Tajiks should go to Tajikistan, Uzbeks to Uzbekistan and the Hazaras to the cemetery.

Unlike Pashtuns, other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, especially the Hazaras, they do not close their doors of schools. They allow their daughters and wives to study, teach and work in the offices. Hazaras do not cultivate poppies. They do not produce or smuggle drugs. Hazara has not yet committed any suicide attack. Although the way is not that much paved for Hazara people in all courses of history of a so-called country Afghanistan, still Hazaras has kept the doors of schools opened and allow their sons and daughters to study and have made a good contribution to the construction, welfare and prosperity of their country. If the Hazaras sometimes took up arms, it was only for self-defense. There was no any sort of aggression on others or any attack carried out by Hazaras.

In Bamiyan province, where the absolute majority is Hazara, there is no attacks, explosions or suicide bombing. All service centres are operating normally. The residents are living with harmony and peacefully with other minorities and the same thing happening in Panjshir province, where the majority of residents are Tajik!

Betrayal, lies, crime, murder, beheading, captivity, cultivation and trafficking of opium and all sort of hashish, extortion, robbery, explosions and suicides attacks, arms sales all belong to the Pashtuns.

What will be the impact of all these ugly Pashtun acts on Pashtun children? The result is clear, a so-called country Afghanistan will never be reached to prosperity with this analysis. The situation is getting worse and worse day by day.

So, eventually, what is the solution?

Firstly, as soon as possible, the United States to annul the peace deal with the Taliban. Ground and airstrikes to be commenced on Taliban terrorists throughout the country as of the only potential solution.

Secondly, the disintegration of Afghanistan into federalism can be the solution in the longer term. To survive the terrorists, this evil and this murderous ethnic group and the enemy of the welfare and prosperity of the people of Afghanistan and finally the enemy of world and humanity.

The way is always paved among Pashtuns for the nesting and growing of global terrorists such as al-Qaeda, ISIS, the Haqqani network and etc. This is the Pashtuns who providing shelters for terrorists. Cultivation of poppy, smuggling and drug production, which is endangering the world. Migration, genocide, child murder, infanticide, women murder, and other forms of crimes in order to have peaceful and stable Afghanistan and must be stopped within Pashtuns that are also for the benefit of the world community's security and safety.

Propaganda: Hazara, as Forced Taliban!

Shamsuddin Mohammadi — 2020-05-04T17:55:25Z

Recently, images of a Hazara Shiite Taliban have surfaced on the social media as a Taliban-appointed district governor in Sar-e-Pul province, identified by the Taliban as the first Hazara Shiite Taliban member in the group.

But, the truths are; first, the Taliban is a highly extremist ideological group, and the majority of the supporters are from Sunni Muslim Pashtun ethnicity. Two, both ethnically and religiously, the difference between Hazara Shiites and Pashtun Sunnis is as different as chalk and cheese!

So, it was based on this ideological difference that the killing of Shiites by the Taliban was considered permissible. Since 1998, under the Taliban's regime, the massacre of Shiite Hazaras was an ordinary action which continues till now. The massacre of common Hazara travelers in recent years across Afghanistan is a clear example of the Pashtun Taliban's hostility against Hazara people from an ideological point of view!

In 1998, Nekpai Valley (located in Doshi district of Baghlan province – north of Afghanistan) inhabited by Hazara-Ismaili minorities came under the Taliban rule. This group forcibly recruited fighters from this ethnic-religious minority against Northern Alliance. Each family had to give a man as a soldier to the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban. Meanwhile, occasionally, the Taliban killed people in the villages and even massacred many of its influential elders in Robatak, an area amid Baghlan and Samangan provinces in the north of the country.

Those conscripts and those who had been recruited forcibly for such a period of service were sent to the front lines of the war against the Northern Alliance, many of whom were killed along the way.

To appease the Taliban, some shown themselves as pro- fighters to the Taliban in order to protect their families and their villages from the harm of the Taliban terrorist group.

During the civil war among the Mojahedin groups, some Hazara Shiites joined the Islamic Party due to contextual realities, which was for the interests of their areas' safety.

Meanwhile, Hezb-e-Islami is also based on Sunni Muslim Pashtun ethnicity, which is not much different from the Taliban. Whenever the Shiite Hazara became Taliban, it has been based on the necessity of the time and compulsion, not on ideological interest!

Well, the war in Afghanistan is undoubtedly a proxy war between regional and supra-regional powers. So, if the Islamic Republic of Iran has used its religious influence on the Shiites of Afghanistan to protect their interests in the region, this could also be possible based on many reasons! For instance, as Hazara youths were sent and used as firewoods to strengthen the foundations of Iran interests in the strongholds of ISIS and Bashar al-Assad's opposition forces in Iraq and Syria using their religious motives for its own benefits! With such an approach, it has merged with Taliban groups to further strengthen Iran's interests in Afghanistan!

In any case, the Hazara have not and will not join the Taliban in any way based on ideological interest and motive. For whatever reason, the Hazara youths have been misused as a consumer tool in different dimensions (Iran used them for its own interests and in cases, time requirements pushed them to join such inharmonic extremist groups).

I Have Passed Through Viruses Even More Dangerous Than Corona

Shamsuddin Mohammadi — 2020-03-07T07:59:39Z

I have passed through viruses even more dangerous than Corona

I was waiting at the bus stop to go Lorient market to buy some foodstuff. I had a slight runny nose and cough; feeling discomfort!

Slowly a woman came to me, without shaking hands, from the distance I could hear her voice, said:
Sir, go to the hospital; do a check-up!

I said; don't worry! Its nothing! I'm just allergic to the cold, this is usually the case in the winter.

She said: You are not afraid of Corona? Because it's very dangerous. And it is very difficult to survive this virus!

I made a cold laugh and pulled out a napkin from my pocket and put it on my nose.

I said; no madam, I have passed much more deadly viruses for so many long!

She said, 'But, what? Are those contagious? She was worried and just glaring at me!

I said, 'Yes, but not contiguous. The viruses that killed me for my appearance, because of my religious beliefs, because of my language dialect. I've gone through these!

She shrugged her shoulders and said, "Aren't you from China?"

I said; no, ma'am!

She furrowed! At the moment I knew her mind was full of questions. She again turned to me and said; "but where are you from?

I said; Afghanistan

She said; " are you Hazara?"

I said; yes

She said; what are you doing here?

I said; to survive those viruses, I am here!

Her eyes were tears and said, "Unfortunately, I know about Afghanistan." My father worked in Afghanistan and told us a lot about the life of Hazaras!
She said; still, you people are suffering those viruses?!

I said; unfortunately!

The scheduled bus arrived then I had to go ...... from a longer distance, I said goodbye ma'am! Just waving! ...

There are really dangerous viruses in the 21st century! Sometimes it appears under the name of al-Qaeda, sometimes under the name of the Taliban and sometimes under the name of ISIS and the Mujahideen and so on......! She was muttering!

کابل پرس

Exclusive Afghan Cricket Team: A Divisive Legacy of Ethnic Privilege

The Influence of Prominent Pashtuns in Shaping Perceptions and Misrepresentations in So-Called Afghanistan

Table of contents

Introduction

Ethnic Disparities and Erasure in the So-Called Afghanistan

Taliban's Assault on Fundamental Rights and the Genocide of the Hazara in So-Called Afghanistan

The Role of Pashtun Women in Lobbying for the Taliban and Their Enjoyment of Ethnic Privilege

Questionable Recognition: PRIO and the Nobel Peace Prize's Contribution to Injustice and Human Rights Abuses

The Role of Influential Pashtuns and the Circulation of False Information about So-Called Afghanistan

Conclusion

Afghanistan Partition Is a Considerable Solution for Peace

Ten Facts That Biden, Harris, Blinken and Austin Should Know About So-Called Afghanistan

The Political Aspects of APTTA

Table of contents

Abstract

Introduction

From “ATTA” to “APTTA”

Informal Trade

APTTA and India

Another angle

Concluding Remarks

How the Taliban Chose the Bullet Over the Ballot?

Table of contents

Abstract

Preface

Hurdles so far

Is there any ideal model of polity in the Islamic history?

What about the present-day Islamic countries?

What are Taliban afraid of?

The probable dream of Taliban

The probable model for Taliban

Are these models applicable in Afghanistan of 21st century?

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

NOTES

Ethnics of So-called Afghanistan: State Department and False Information

Will the So-Called Country Afghanistan Reach to Prosperity With the Pashtuns?

Table of contents

So, eventually, what is the solution?

Propaganda: Hazara, as Forced Taliban!

I Have Passed Through Viruses Even More Dangerous Than Corona